THE PERSISTENCE OF L.A.'S GROCERY GAPRZEE

THE NEED FOR A NEW FOOD POLICY AND APPROACH TO MARKET DEVELOPMENT

BY: AMANDA SHAFFER



THE PERSISTENCE OF L.A.'S GROCERY GAP: THE NEED FOR A NEW FOOD POLICY AND APPROACH TO MARKET DEVELOPMENT

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<u>Mission</u>

Actively contributing to the development of a more livable, just, and democratic region through research,

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	5
Executive Summary	11
Introduction	13
Chapter 1 The Urban Grocery Store Gap	<u>15</u>
The Racial Divide	15
Higher Prices	16
And Lower Quality	17
Chapter 2 The Importance of Supermarkets: Health and Diet Implications	18
Food Access and Diets	18
Role of Diet	19
Health Implications	19
Food Insecurity and Obesity	20
The Cost of Obesity	20
Supermarket Investment as Obesity Prevention	21
Chapter 3 Why Supermarkets Do Not Locate in Low-Income Communities	22
Profitability	22
Crime	22
Locations	23
Cultural Biases	23
Understanding the Mixed Market	
Local Politics	24

Chapter 4 Why Some Supermarkets are Successful in Low-Income Communities	25
Population Density Increases Spending Power	25
Unmet Grocery Demand	25
Analyzing Profit Potential	26
Food Stamps Impact Inner City Spending Power	26
Reducing Shrink with Technology	27
Winning Culture Reduces Shrink	27
The Role of Unions	27
Bond with the Community	29
Customer Loyalty	29
Meeting Community Demands/Needs	30
Joint Ventures	30
Land Use	31
Public Market	31
The Opportunities Are There	32

Chapter 5 One Hundred Years of Market Divide: Tracing the Evolution of the Urban Grocery Store Gap in

Los Angeles	33
First Supermarkets	33
Role of Transportation	34
Role of Housing Policy	34
Changing Demographics	35
The Watts Riots	35
Profit Potential	35
Urban Fortress	36
Supermarket Consolidation	36
Latino Influx	37
Korean Grocers	37
The Widening Divide	38

Chapter 6 The Gap Persists: Ten Years After	39
Supermarket Investment Claims	39
Rebuilding Effort Wanes	40

Zip codes with a white majority experience the greatest number of supermarkets per person: 3.17 times as many supermarkets as populations with an African-American majority; 1.09 times as many supermarkets as populations with an Asian majority; 1.69 times as many supermarkets as populations with a Latino majority.

Recommendations:

This report recommends a major initiative that combines a proactive public sector approach, strong community involvement and supermarket industry investment strategies. The criteria for

Introduction

Immediately following the civil unrest in Los Angeles in 1992, the Los Angeles Times, Mayor Tom Bradley, and numerous public officials, industry executives, and academic analysts recognized the need to overcome the unequal distribution of supermarkets in Los Angeles County that left low-income communities underserved by full-service grocery stores. Newspaper headlines touted commitments by supermarkets to build new stores in the riot torn areas. The supermarket industry trade organization declared a new era of market development in the inner city. Peter Ueberroth, the head of a commission appointed by the mayor to "Rebuild L.A.," argued that supermarkets would take the lead in private sector investment in underserved areas, by bringing jobs and services to inner city communities. Supermarket executives suggested they now recognized the potential value in reversing a trend they had generated over the previous three decades of suburban investment— to the exclusion of inner city investment. As former Vons CEO Roger Strangeland put it, "We concluded that there was an enormously dense population that we were not serving adequately or not serving at all. On the other hand, we realized we had been considering sites in the hinterland that had more jack rabbits than people."¹ Change, it seemed, was in the air.

Yet ten years later low-income, predominately minority communities in Los Angeles still have significantly fewer supermarkets than do suburban, white, middle and upper class neighborhoods. The tenth anniversary of the civil unrest has helped bring attention once again to the lack of progress of supermarket investment in low-income communities. The limited progress that was made (for example an increase in the number of Latino-oriented markets) was offset by little net gain in the overall number of full service markets currently operating in the areas impacted by the 1992 civil unrest. In order for real change to occur, new roles, strategies, and objectives based on community participation in conjunction with a proactive commitment from the public and private sectors, need to be developed on a long-term basis. Community groups and other grassroots organizations in Los Angeles have continued to mobilize around these issues, but their efforts alone will not bring significant improvements to supermarket access in low-income communities in Los Angeles. As a recent publication from the Economic Roundtable reported, a bad situation has been made even worse:

The steep decline in South Los Angeles' job base since the 1992 civil unrest despite the ambitious goals for economic recovery announced by public officials and civic leaders suggests that this area has experienced a double disservice at public hands—labeling and neglect. The area has suffered from being labeled an economic invalid and a distressed community, and yet it has not benefited from the help that was promised for remedying these acknowledged needs.²

This report seeks to revisit the issue of LA's urban grocery gap, its roots, its impacts, what has happened in the ten years since April 1992, and the opportunities for change that need to be nurtured and implemented at multiple levels of policy and community engagement.

The consequences of the grocery store gap are many. As an official with the Environmental Protection Agency recently stated: "The lack of private transportation and supermarkets in low-wealth and predominately black neighborhoods suggests that residents of these neighborhoods

may be at a disadvantage when attempting to achieve a healthy diet."³ The absence of a healthy diet, as the EPA statement also suggests, is fundamentally a problem of access, not just choice, a core outcome of the existence of this gap.

Why focus on supermarkets? Increasing access to healthy food may require a number of strategies. Farmers' markets and other farm-to-

14

Chapter 1 The Urban Grocery Store Gap

When people and jobs moved out of the central cities to the suburbs in the 1950's, grocery stores went with them; and despite the fact that the population in America's central cities doubled between 1970 and 1990,⁴ the number of grocery stores in the inner city remained small. This trend has not been significantly reversed. A series of studies in the 1990's increasingly pointed to a continuing urban grocery store gap. In 1995, a study entitled "The Urban Grocery Store Gap" found that there was one full-service grocery store for every 7,795 people in metropolitan Los Angeles. The ratio for the urban core low-income communities was less than half that figure, with one grocery store per 16,571 people.⁵ This situation was not limited to Los Angeles. In 1997, a study by R.M. Donohue tested the following hypothesis: While "central cities experienced substantial declines in grocery stores from 1960-1990...this trend ended in the early 1990s, followed by a period of reinvestment."⁶ He concluded that while the first assertion was valid, the second assertion, that reinvestment was occurring, could not be identified on a national level.⁷ A 1999 study of the Twin Cities in Minnesota found that only 22% of the chain stores in their sample were located in the inner city area, while 60% of the non-chain stores were located in the inner city, with neither type store as likely to locate in a poor compared to a non-poor area.⁸ A series of articles by a reporter for the Detroit News found that only eight chain supermarkets served the 900,000 city residents of Detroit, while chain supermarkets were found on nearly every major corner in several suburbs.⁹ In 2001, the Farmers' Market Trust quantified this urban-suburban divergence in Philadelphia: there were 156% fewer supermarkets located in the lowest income neighborhoods than there were in the highest income neighborhoods.¹⁰ The Farmers' Market Trust also found that supermarkets are not dispersed according to population concentration but by income level, with low-income communities experiencing a continuing lack of access to supermarkets.¹¹ This deficiency is compounded by the fact that low-income people have less money to spend on food and own fewer cars. Having to pay the higher prices often charged at corner stores or bear the expense of paying for transportation to outlying suburban stores would represent a more significant expenditure to a person earning a low-end wage than would a similar increase in expenses for a person with a higher income.

The Racial Divide

The supermarket divide is not just an economic divide—it is a racial divide as well. According to the <u>Massachusetts News</u>, not a single chain supermarket exists in Boston's predominately African-American Roxbury, Mattapan, or North Dorchester neighborhoods.¹² A study by the *American Journal of Preventative Medicine* examined demographic characteristics of neighborhoods in four states in relation to food stores and food service places. The researchers found that the divide in supermarket access was not just between low and high-income neighborhoods (the prevalence of supermarkets in high-income neighborhoods was found to be

three times that of low-income neighborhoods) but between predominately black and white neighborhoods, with the latter experiencing four times as many supermarkets as black neighborhoods.¹³

Higher Prices...

The dearth of chain supermarkets in inner city neighborhoods creates another problem: the presence of fewer large stores means less competition, a circumstance which leads to higher prices and lower quality. James Baldwin's 1964 essay on life in Harlem described a phenomenon that still holds true today: "Anyone who has ever struggled with poverty knows how extremely expensive it is to be poor...Go shopping one day in Harlem—for anything—and compare Harlem prices and quality with those downtown."¹⁴ While some have contested this theory, citing improper data collection and analysis,¹⁵ there is a wide array of studies that indicate that, in fact, people in poor neighborhoods do pay more for lower quality and less variety.

To an extent, this is a result of the higher concentration of mom'n'pop stores which do not have the revenue base to keep their prices low, nor to carry a large variety of products. A study by the USDA found that prices in such smaller stores are at least 10% higher than prices at large supermarkets.¹⁶ The study of the Twin Cities also found that a significant factor in explaining the price disparity they found between stores in the inner city and the suburbs was the density of chain supermarkets -- prices were lower at chain markets no matter where they were located.¹⁷ However, there is some evidence that price discrepancies do exist even among chain stores located in different neighborhoods. The Detroit News study found that the cheapest brand of chicken legs and thighs at one of the few supermarkets in inner city Detroit cost 100% more than the cheapest brand at a suburban supermarket; potatoes were 25% more expensive as well.¹⁸ While clearly not a scientific sample due in part to its sample size, the Detroit study is still suggestive of the problem that even large supermarkets may charge more in poor neighborhoods. In 1995, a Los Angeles Times article about a Ralphs merger acknowledged that prices in its South Central store locations "have traditionally been higher."¹⁹ A more systematic 1993 UCLA study also found slightly higher prices for an equivalent market basket at an inner city supermarket compared to the same chain store in a middle-income community. That same study further pointed out, by using census data, that low-income residents in the study area paid as much as three times their disposable income on food as middle income residents who lived near where the comparable chain store was located. And when low-income people pay a higher percentage of their earnings for food, small increases in food prices can have a significant impact, requiring choices about what necessities (e.g., paying for housing or food) they may be forced to sacrifice.

...And Lower Quality

Lower quality and poor product choices also plague the shopping choices of many inner city residents. Upon entering a Ralphs grocery store in a low income neighborhood in central Los Angeles, shoppers are confronted immediately with packaged cookies, doughnuts, candy, and

chips.²⁰ The entrance to a Ralphs in the more affluent community of Pasadena presents an entirely different picture: shoppers encounter a

Chapter 2

The Importance of Supermarkets: Health and Diet Implications

Recently, a conservative think-tank, the Heritage Foundation, published a report by Robert Rector on welfare reform in which the author argued, "In reality, there is little material poverty in the United States...The principal nutrition-related problem facing the poor in America is obesity, not hunger; the poor have a higher rate of obesity than other socioeconomic groups."²⁹ To begin with, this statement is not entirely true, as higher rates of obesity have been found among poor women, but not poor men.³⁰ More importantly, Rector's argument that obesity is the result of the poor having more than enough food to eat fails to account for the discrepancies in the quality and types of food that are accessible in low-income neighborhoods compared to more affluent neighborhoods.

The cause of obesity is not necessarily too much

AMA consider these estimates of prevalence to be conservative due to sampling methods that relied on self-reporting and excluded the part of the population without telephones, but it also found that the number of obese Americans had nearly doubled in the past 20 years. Perhaps even more alarming, the estimated obesity rate for children has more than doubled since the 1960's.³⁷ An epidemic is defined as "the occurrence in a community or geographic area of a disease at a rate that clearly exceeds the normally expected rate."³⁸ With the dramatic increase in unhealthy weight gain in the U.S., it is clear that obesity has become an epidemic.

Role of Diet

Public health officials attribute this obesity epidemic to major changes in two aspects of Americans' behavior in recent decades: diet and exercise. While behavioral patterns, such as heavier reliance on cars for short-distance trips, and barriers to exercise obviously need to be addressed, dietary aspects of the obesity epidemic must be focused on as well. The American diet is influenced by a mass media-driven consumer culture in which children are bombarded by the "9 out of 10 food ads on Saturday morning TV [that] are for sugary cereals, candy, salty snacks, fatty fast foods and other junk food,"³⁹ and in which the size of a soft-drink has quintupled, with a "child-size" soft drink ordered at McDonalds today equal to the "large" size in the 1940's. Foods high in fat and sugar and low in nutritional value have come to characterize the American diet.⁴⁰ Fast food has been integral in this change, with researchers finding a statistically significant correlation between a higher BMI and people who ate food away from home within the previous 24-hour period.⁴¹ Fast food provides the least nutritional away-from-home meal and is also the cheapest and most available option. Children's diets are among those most affected by society's changing attitude toward food, with 84% of children and teens eating too much total fat and 91% eating too much saturated fat.⁴² At the same time, people are eating fewer servings of fruits and vegetables per day.⁴³ Given that overweight children are likely to become overweight adults, the trend toward obesity shows no signs of abating.

Health Implications

Obesity is a public health concern because it is associated with a high degree of morbidity and

Food Insecurity and Obesity

While the increased popularity of cheap, high-fat, low-nutrition food has had a worldwide effect, leading the World Health Organization to call obesity a "global epidemic," the situation is worst for some of the most neglected populations in this country. For women, a direct correlation has been found between food insecurity (not having enough food to eat) and obesity.⁵⁰ With the exception of Asians, racial minorities exhibit higher rates of obesity than do white Americans, with female minorities of low socioeconomic status having the highest obesity rates of all.⁵¹ In 2000, Blacks were found to have the highest rates of obesity among racial groups, and people with less than a high school education were found to have the highest rates of obesity based on educational levels

Nevertheless, public policies designed to secure access to fresh, affordable and quality food as a public good—and a human right—have not been widely established, nor has fresh food access as a form of health care been sufficiently recognized. The IRS, for example, considers obesity treatments to be medical expenses only if they are undertaken in the course of treating another disease, such as diabetes or heart disease, and the same is true for the Federal government and Medicare. Medicare officials maintain that obesity is *not* a disease and therefore will not cover treatment costs until such treatments are prescribed for other medical problems.⁵⁸ These positions run counter to the position of the Surgeon General who issued a strong declaration in 2001 about the incidence of obesity as a major public health concern.

Supermarket Investment as Obesity Prevention

Without taking into account other food-related strategies, building more grocery stores in the inner city will not alone reduce the incidence of obesity, but establishing public policies to facilitate such a development can and should be considered part of a broader public health approach. Public health analyst Nicholas Freudenberg has argued that for health promotion to be effective in urban areas, practitioners must focus on a range of issues for improving quality and access, reducing risk behavior, and improving social conditions.⁵⁹ The same is true for tackling the obesity problem. Public health should focus on facilitating community access to physical exercise and to quality food, on providing education about how to maintain a healthy diet and make physical activity part of everyday life, and on addressing the social conditions that prevent a sector of the population from having access to and being able to afford healthy food. Studies suggest that it is quite difficult to make people change their eating habits, but, as Mary Jane Schneider has argued in a review of public health issues, "making nutritious foods more readily available—intervention at the community and institution levels—would encourage people to choose their food more wisely."⁶⁰

Chapter 3 Why Supermarkets Do Not Locate in Low-Income Communities

Why has food access, specifically access to fresh and affordable food that is available at a fullservice food market, become such a protracted problem in low-income communities? This chapter explores various factors that have been identified as key barriers for supermarket investment in low-income communities. The following chapter will then explore opportunities and advantages for such investment, with emphasis on those areas where barriers have been identified.

Profitability

Supermarket chains often cite lack of profitability as a barrier to investment in low-income communities. Corporate executives argue that the profit margin at supermarkets is so small that their companies simply cannot afford to take risks on potentially unprofitable locations. The profit margin of supermarkets often averages around 1% of total sales. Consequently, stores are sensitive to changes in such factors as consumer behavior or crime rates, and as a result are hesitant to locate where consumption patterns are less desirable, or crime rates are higher. For example, stores profit more from selling a high volume of low-priced items than they do from selling a few expensive items; profit is greater from the sale of ten items with a one-cent markup than it is from the sale of one item with a ten-cent mark up. Low-income shoppers tend to have a lower volume of sales per customer, which can make the low-income consumer appear less profitable. In addition, people who have less disposable income tend to make smaller per-trip purchases, which means that overhead might be higher in low-income neighborhoods where the per-customer sales volume is smaller than it is in wealthier neighborhoods.

Crime

Chain supermarkets have identified higher crime rates in low-income urban communities as a central barrier for investment. "Shrink" is the term the grocery industry uses to describe the income a store loses to employee theft, shoplifting, backdoor receiving errors and dishonesty, damaged goods, retail pricing and accounting department errors. Given the high-volume sales focus of supermarkets, it is not surprising to find, according to the 2001 Supermarket Shrink Survey, that stores which exceed 40,000 sq. ft. have lower shrink rates than do smaller stores.⁶¹ Inner city stores tend to be smaller than 40,000 sq. ft., so size is one reason why stores in low-income communities tend to lose more profit to shrink. With employee theft and shoplifting accounting for the majority of losses to shrink, it is often assumed that a store located in a high

crime area will experience a higher percentage of shrink and a lower percentage of profits.

predominately black neighborhoods.⁷⁰ In Los Angeles County, zip codes whose populations are 40-100% white have an average of 2.21 times as many supermarkets per person as zip codes

Chapter 4

Why Some Supermarkets are Successful in Low-Income Communities

Despite the barriers identified in the previous chapter, there is also evidence that stores can be successful in the inner city. Officials from the Pathmark grocery chain in Newark, New Jersey, say that they have not had a problem with finding quality employees nor have they had a greater problem with shoplifting at their inner city locations than at suburban stores.⁷⁹ In addition, the Food Marketing Institute's 2000-2001 Annual Financial Review found that supermarket profits are the highest they have been in thirty years, signifying that perhaps the industry is not quite as financially strapped as often presented.⁸⁰

Population Density Increases Spending Power

Numerous studies have refuted claims about lack of profitability, arguing that the population density of urban areas is an often-overlooked asset when examining a basic necessity such as food. For example, Social Compact, a community development corporation in Washington, D.C., discovered that the per-acre spending power in a low-income Hispanic neighborhood in Chicago was \$85,018, more than twice that of a high-end suburban neighborhood.⁸¹ In Los Angeles, the Top Valu chain that is located in low-income communities reports a per customer checkout bill of only \$15-\$20 compared to a \$20-\$28 average bill at major chain stores. However, Top Valu's sales per square foot of store space are \$800 to \$850, more than double that of the major chain supermarkets.⁸² The per-customer spending power may be lower, but this does not necessarily translate into lower sales. A study by Strategic Mindshare found that urban stores comprised a greater number of the top ten performers within a chain than did rural or suburban stores,⁸³ while the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) found that the highest grossing Super Stop 'N' Shop in Boston was located in an inner city neighborhood.⁸⁴ Newark's Pathmark has a fifth of its stores in urban areas but makes a quarter of its profits from those stores.⁸⁵

Unmet Grocery Demand

While some stores are already reaping the benefits of a captive consumer base, there is still an unmet demand for groceries. In 1995, RLA found that central city Los Angeles had an unmet grocery demand of \$412 million a year.⁸⁶ A 1999 map of the distribution of supermarket sales in Philadelphia shows that in some areas the consumption rate is higher than it should be for the number of people who live there, indicating that people are traveling there from other supermarket-poor communities to meet their shopping needs.⁸⁷

Reducing Shrink with Technology

Deterring theft (reducing shrink) is also an important part of making new investors successful. One way this can occur is through the use of improved technology. New high-tech shopping cart systems with transmitters in the wheels of the carts prevent customers from taking shopping carts beyond the supermarket parking lot by causing the wheels to lock if the cart moves outside the property boundaries. In the two years since SuperWarehouse Foods in Pasadena, Texas, installed such an operation, the system has paid for itself two times over in the amount of money saved from reduced shopping cart loss.⁹² Another strategy for reducing shrink is described by <u>Supermarket Business</u> as the "marriage of digitized closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems with POS [point of sale] data mining."⁹³ Managers are able to program software to monitor employees for suspicious behavior or to identify areas where more training is needed, speeding up a process that used to take months of tedious examination of videotapes or electronic journals.⁹⁴ Other software programs such as Shrink Trax also help identify cashier dishonesty or inefficiency.⁹⁵ Such technology should have a significant impact in reducing shrink, as the 2000 and 2001 Supermarket Shrink Surveys found the greatest percentage of loss attributable to employees, rather than to shoplifting.⁹⁶

Winning Culture Reduces Shrink

A second and perhaps more important and effective form of theft and crime deterrence involves the relationship between the supermarket and its employees. As Larry Miller, president of Trax Software, which produces loss prevention technology, put it: "Technology alone isn't the answer, it's at best only a tool for enabling real, constructive cultural change." Miller describes employment-based contributions to health insurance premiums, and higher rates of pension coverage than non-unionized workers."¹⁰⁰ Members of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union earn an average of \$162 more per week nation-wide than do non-union retail food clerks.¹⁰¹ Beyond higher pay and health benefits, union workers have a degree of protection from lay-offs, especially as they gain seniority over time.

Union participation in Southern California is an especially positive asset for the region, with membership being relatively higher than in most other parts of the country. The high degree of unionization translates into higher wages across the board, leading the Los Angeles Times to report in 1995 that "grocery workers in the West are the best-paid in America."¹⁰² Rick Icaza, president of the UFCW local 770 has argued that "supermarket jobs are probably the last good jobs left in the inner city."¹⁰³ The major Southern California chain supermarkets like Vons, Ralphs and Albertson's have union contracts, which is part of the reason inner city communities with high unemployment rates are eager to attract the chain stores.

However, the entrance of non-union stores into the Southern California market is threatening to reduce the number of jobs and lower wages. Smaller chains and independent stores, as well as warehouse stores and supercenters like Kmart and Wal-Mart, tend not to be unionized and offer their employees fewer benefits. These non-union stores are able to offer lower prices as their

Bond with the Community

Just as treating employees with respect and digni

Haagen's development firm partnered with the Vermont Slauson Economic Development Corporation to construct the Vermont Slauson shopping center. According to Haagen, "These projects pay for themselves. What the hell did it cost us? Peanuts!" Of the increased employment opportunities created by the new supermarket and other retail shops says Haagen, "These jobs create a sense of pride."¹¹⁷

Across the country other developers and supermarkets have mirrored Haagen's optimism about his successful redevelopment in South Central Los Angeles. For example, in southeast Washington D.C. the Anacostia Economic Development Corporation collaborated with Safeway to construct a 55,000-sq. ft. store in an underserved low-income area. In Harlem, the Abyssian Baptist Church CDC partnered with Pathmark to open a store that created more than 275 jobs, the great majority of which were filled by neighborhood residents. The Pathmark location was developed and owned by the East Harlem Abyssian Triangle Limited Partnership, a consortium of the Community Association of East Harlem Triangle, Inc., Abyssian Development Corporation, Retail Initiative, Inc. and the New York City Economic Development Corporation. Helping to alleviate barriers for site acquisition, or locating land for store construction, the Greater Dwight Development Corporation in New Haven partnered with Shaw's Supermarket to build a store on an abandoned car dealership lot.¹¹⁸ Piecing together parcels of land to create an affordable and sizable piece of property represents a significant benefit that CDC's can provide in the supermarket development process.

Land Use

Part of the reason that supermarkets experience difficulty finding adequate land in the inner city is that the "super" sized grocery stores are a suburban convention. One hundred years ago central city residents met their shopping needs at public markets that used creative methods, such as using long, narrow spaces down the middle of wide boulevards, to fit more easily into the urban landscape.¹¹⁹ Dallas' increasingly affluent downtown seemed to think that such a market would be a great idea. In 1999, city officials hoped to inject \$2.2 into renovating a shed to house a grocery store that would sell meat, fish and dairy products, located within a farmers' market.¹²⁰ Perhaps now that urban population density is again reaching high levels, markets that are reminiscent of the public market houses, such as Los Angeles' Grand Central Market, can become a viable source for food shopping for low-income people as well as for high-end consumers like those moving into downtown Dallas.

Public Market

A publicly owned market could also reduce problems associated with trying to attract private investment, as well as provide entrepreneurial opportunities to community members in the tradition of the LA-based non-profit group Esperanza's Mercado La Paloma. According to James M. Mayo in <u>The American Grocery Store</u>:

"The most radical transformation in the decline of public markets was the

Chapter 5

One Hundred Years of Market Divide: Tracing the Evolution of the Urban Grocery Store Gap in

Los Angeles

Following the 1992 civil unrest in Los Angeles, public attention was drawn to the increasingly visible urban grocery store gap in the city's urban core/low-income neighborhoods. In 1992, the predominantly minority and low-income residents at the city's core had access to fewer than half as many full-service grocery stores as did the majority white and middle-to-upper class residents of surrounding suburbs. This chapter documents the continuing, and in some cases even wider, gap that exists today where the average number of supermarkets per household in zip codes with few low-income residents is more than three times greater than the number of supermarkets in zip codes that are predominantly low-income.¹²³ In addition, zip codes where the population is more than 20% white have access to a greater number of supermarkets per capita than do zip codes where blacks make up more than 20% of the population.¹²⁴ Without access to supermarkets, inner city residents miss out on the high quality, low prices, variety, and convenience that suburban full-service grocery stores provide.

In 1992, a <u>Los Angeles Times</u> article cited "30 years of red-lining"¹²⁵ as one cause for this food divide, suggesting that the fallout from the earlier 1965 riots continued to impact the community.¹²⁶ While loan denial and fear of failure in the inner city were clearly factors, the history of inadequate .2()-10(m)13.91 Tc[es 3dents arkets, inner ala0.010(m1re clearl)-loan deniales where0 10

system and tended to be more spread out, making the success of market houses less viable. As a result, while public market houses existed in LA, the city began its conversion to a more

charge higher prices than at their suburban locations, with one executive commenting, "We have faith in the area and in the people."¹⁴⁰ Similarly, three ABC stores opened in South Central and were applauded by one analyst as "a monument to imagination and adaptation on the part of an effective management."¹⁴¹ The previous management had in fact been criticized for not facilitating positive customer-store relations.

Urban Fortress

In addition to attempting to alleviate white-owner/black-consumer tensions, the post-riot stores

36

a chain. For example, Yucaipa's buy-out of Ralphs and subsequent merger of Ralphs and Food 4 Less in 1995 resulted in anti-trust regulators ordering the shutdown of 27 stores. Ralphs decided to close another 28 stores because of direct competition between Food 4 Less and Ralphs stores located proximate to each other.¹⁴⁸ Stores in poor high-crime areas were more likely to be closed in this and other major store mergers that have occurred in the last 10 years, since they were perceived to be among the lower performing or at least more risky locations. These mergers had important implications not only for the people who used to shop at stores that closed, but for store employees as well: one thousand workers were laid off as a result of the Ralphs-Food 4 Less merger.¹⁴⁹

Latino Influx

During this period of consolidation, the demographics of central city Los Angeles changed again, with an influx of Latino immigrants increasing the population density and creating a racial majority in many neighborhoods that had previously been predominantly African-American. Between 1970 and 1990, the percentage of Hispanic residents in metropolitan Los Angeles more than doubled.¹⁵⁰ To serve the needs of this increasing population, and in response to demand created by the exodus of chain stores from the inner city, some independents and smaller chains like Superior Warehouse Foods opened in buildings previously occupied by Ralphs and other major chains.¹⁵¹ Perhaps most significant among these markets were the Latino-owned and oriented supermarkets such

business. As often happens in economically depressed communities, issues of scarce jobs, money, and resources materialized as race-based resentment. Korean grocer Hyong Kim described it thus: "What many grocers don't realize is it's not about black people stealing from Koreans. It's a problem of people with no money."¹⁵⁶ Sadly, just two years after Kim made this statement in the <u>Los Angeles Times</u>, he was robbed and beaten to death by black gang members.¹⁵⁷ While Kim's son insisted that this act not be considered a race issue but simply a horrible crime, the escalation to violence of racial tension between blacks and Koreans was a trend all too familiar by the early 1990's.

The Widening Divide

The period between the 1965 and 1992 civil unrest in Los Angeles proved to be a period of significant decline in access to fresh and affordable food in low-income communities in Los Angeles. Earlier trends of supermarket flight to the suburbs had become magnified. While highlighting the problem of the lack of food access in 1965, stores that burned to the ground were never rebuilt and the problems—and tensions associated with increased food insecurity—grew worse. Given the forces at play—whether supermarket consolidation, the decline of any public role, inter-ethnic tensions, or the trend to bigger stores and parking lots in the suburbs—the question remained: could it be turned around? Would supermarkets be willing and able to return to the inner city?

Chapter 6 The Gap Persists: Ten Years After

The kinds of conditions that led to the civil unrest in 1965 caused another explosive outburst of anger and rioting in April 1992 in several low-income neighborhoods in Central Los Angeles. Again, food stores were looted and burned.

Rebuilding Effort Wanes


However, by 1994, momentum from the private sector had slowed, and community criticism of the top-down attitude led to a restructuring of RLA. Rather than touting private sector promises that were already being seen as problematic, RLA decided to take a community-oriented bottom-up focus. As part of its needs assessment, RLA surveyed 1,100 residents in a 52square-mile area affected by the civil unrest regarding the goods and services their community was lacking.¹⁶⁵ The overwhelming response indicated a need for quality grocery stores and supermarkets. By this time, a few of the stores that Vons, Ralphs, Food 4 Less, and Smart & Final had committed to build were constructed and open already, indicating that some of the promises of new investment were based on plans that were developed prior to the civil unrest. Even with the handful of additional stores, residents in central city Los Angeles still cited lack of supermarkets as a major problem. In response, RLA performed a supermarket study that demonstrated that there was an annual unmet demand for groceries of \$412 million, which translated to 750,000 sq. ft. of selling area.¹⁶⁷ The study identified one full-service supermarket for every 7,795 people in greater Los Angeles, but only one such store for every 16,571 people in the RLA study area.¹⁶⁸ Inner city Los Angeles continued to suffer a lack of full-service grocery stores. In 1997, RLA disbanded, and the problem of the urban grocery store gap in Los Angeles largely disappeared from newspaper headlines. Ultimately, fewer than half of the stores promised by the four chains and touted by Ueberroth and others were built and a couple of those have since closed. The next section of this chapter documents the status of supermarket activity in Los Angeles, including the persistence of the grocery gap in lowincome communities.

Updating of the RLA Study: Documenting the Gap

In their 1995 supermarket study, RLA focused on a 52 square mile section of central Los Angeles. The study defined the area of "riot-torn and surrounding low-income communities" as bounded by Alameda Avenue to the east, Wilshire Blvd. to the north, Crenshaw Blvd. to the west and El Segundo to the south. In this area, RLA took an inventory of full-service grocery stores and found a total of 55 stores, 23 independents and 32 chain supermarkets.¹⁶⁹ An evaluation of the same area in 2002 yields a total of 56 stores, 26 independents and 30 chain supermarkets. (See Appendix A for a list of the stores) With a net gain of only one store, the area has not seen a significant increase in supermarkets since the RLA study.

The RLA Study also cited a figure of one grocery store for every 7,795 people in metropolitan Los Angeles and one full-service grocery store for every 16,751 people in the RLA Study Area. In order to update this statistic, supermarkets that fall under the government SIC code 5411 (grocery) and have annual sales of \$10 million or more have been identified (See Appendix). Stores that earn less than \$10 million were eliminated in an effort to exclude convenience stores and limited assortment stores. The tabulation finds that each supermarket in Los Angeles County serves 18,649 people, while in the RLA Study Area,¹⁷⁰ one supermarket serves 27, 986 people. While these numbers are quite different from the 1995 figures provided by RLA, this is likely the result of different criteria in deciding to include or exclude a store. While the differential in the people to supermarket ratio between the RLA Study Area and the rest of LA County in 2002 appears as if it has improved since 1995, the access rates (the number of people

Chain and Independent Supermarkets in Riot-torn and Surrounding



served per market) significantly declined for both LA County and the RLA areas. These contrasting figures are likely to be the result of different methodologies when calculating the number of people served by a supermarket. Regardless, a significant differential—the persistence of the gap—remains evident.

This gap in supermarket access further widens when examining particular communities like Compton and East Los Angeles, as compared to more affluent communities like South Pasadena and Santa Monica.

An examination of supermarket access in low-income and minority communities throughout Los Angeles County further demonstrates the nature of the gap. In constructing the following tables, households whose annual incomes were below \$15,000 in 1998 and households whose annual incomes fell below \$35,000 in 1998 were examined. While \$15,000 is proximate to the federal definition of the poverty level for a family of four, the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) has argued that this is a gross misrepresentation of actual poverty. When both the cost of living in Los Angeles and the income level at which people qualify for government anti-poverty programs like food stamps and Medicare was used, LAANE calculated an income level to define poverty that is twice as high as the federal level. LAANE's annual income that defined a family of four as poor in 1998 was \$33,300.¹⁷¹ The


Examination of Supermarket Access in Relation to Federal Poverty Line¹⁷²

*In this and all following charts in this chapter "surrounding community" is defined as the zip code in which the supermarkets are located.

What the Chart Shows:

In the zip codes in Los Angeles County where 10-20% of the households earn less than \$15,000 annually, the number of supermarkets per household is .0000213, which equates to approximately 2.13 supermarkets for every 10,000 households.

In zip codes with 0-10% of the households living below the federal poverty line there are approximately 2.26 times as many superma 10,000 households.




Examination of Adjusted Poverty Line in Relation to Supermarket Access¹⁷³

What the Chart Shows:

In zip codes where 10-20% of households earn less than \$35,000 annually, the average number of supermarkets per capita is.00035, which is approximately 3.5 supermarkets for every 10,000 households.

In zip codes where 10-20% of households are earning less than \$35,000 annually, there are 3.04 times as many supermarkets as there are in zip codes where 60-70% of households are living below the adjusted poverty line.

There is a general trend of decline in supermarkets per household as the percentage of people who live in poverty increases, meaning the higher the concentration of poverty within a community, the fewer the supermarkets.




What the Chart Shows:

In zip codes where the percent of the population that is white is 0-10%, there are .000044 supermarkets per person, which is approximately .44 supermarkets for every 10,000 people.

In zip codes where the population is 80-90% white, there are 2.18 times as many supermarkets as there are in zip codes where the population is only 0-10% white.

There is a general increasing trend in per capita supermarkets as the percentage of the population that is white increases, meaning the higher the concentration of whites within a community, the more supermarkets.



Supermarkets per 10,000 Residents Compared to Percent of Population that is African-American


What the Chart Shows:

In zip codes where the percent of the population that is African-American is 0-10%, there are .000066 supermarkets per person, which is approximately .66 supermarkets for every 10,000 people.

In zip codes where the population is 0-10% African-American, there are 2.06 times as many supermarkets as there are in zip codes where the population is 70-80% African-American.

In zip codes where the African-American populations constitute 60-70% and 80-90% of the population, there are no supermarkets.

There is a general trend of decline in per capita supermarkets as the percentage of the population that is African-American increases, meaning the higher the concentration of African-American people within a community, the fewer the supermarkets.



What the Chart Shows:

In zip codes where the percent of the population that is Latino is 0-10%, there are .000082 supermarkets per person, which is approximately .82 supermarkets for every 10,000 people.

In zip codes where the population is 0-10% Latino, there are 2.34 as many supermarkets as there are in zip codes where the population is 90-100% Latino.

There is a general trend of decline in per capita supermarkets as the percentage of the population that is Latino increases, meaning the higher the concentration of Latino people within a community, the fewer the supermarkets.

Chapter 6

What the Chart Shows:

In zip codes where Whites constitute a racial majority, there are .76 supermarkets for every 10,000 residents.

In zip codes where African-Americans constitute a racial majority, there are .24 supermarkets for every 10,000 residents.

In zip codes where Asians constitute a racial

Ten years after the civil unrest, Los Angeles County residents continue to suffer from unequal access to supermarkets. Inner city LA as defined by Rebuild LA, has 33% fewer supermarkets per resident than the rest of LA County. Across the county, supermarket access is heavily influenced by the average income and race of the surrounding community. The higher the

Chapter 7

Recommendations for the Future

Inner city supermarket success stories can be found all over the country, and there are even a few in Los Angeles. While the experiences of these stores can provide valuable insight into techniques for gaining community, private and public support, the problem is that these are individual, single stores scattered around the country. They alone cannot solve the problem of limited supermarket availability for the poor and minorities. Instead, a citywide, comprehensive strategy must be devised, with specific criteria to ensure that stores are developed in a ways that are conducive to long-term survival and that benefit both developer and customers. This chapter provides both the specific policies for supermarket development and the criteria and goals that need to be implemented for the grocery gap to be overcome.

Public Sector: Active Approach

A study by urban planner Kameshwari Pothukuchi found that the public role in supermarket investment in low-income urban communities tended to be "more reactive than activist."¹⁷⁴ For supermarkets to be successful in inner city Los Angeles, the public sector must take an active role in encouraging investment. Beyond simply offering assistance and advice to a company regarding location identification or re-zoning applications, the city should identify land, clean it up, expedite zoning and permitting processes, and offer financial incentives such as subsidies and tax breaks. In addition, market feasibility studies should be conducted in order to ensure the viability of the success of the market and to entice potential corporate investors. The involvement of the public sector should not end when a store agrees to construct in the new location. The city can aid in issues such as parking, security, and transportation. For example, the city could enact policy that requires public transportation to take into consideration access to food, thereby increasing bus routes between poor inner city residential areas and supermarkets.

Private Sector: Held Accountable

Another benefit of an active public sector is that Los Angeles can take a citywide approach to the problem. Instead of just constructing one or two new stores without taking unmet demand into account, attracting a chain to build several stores would not only result in more widespread change, but will make the investment in the community more worthwhile for the company. If a chain is opening five or ten locations instead of one, they will be more motivated to research the type of format and product mix that will be successful in the area. In 1990, the Dallas City Council developed an attractive package of financial incentives for supermarket development in predominately low-income South Dallas. In order to hold the winning bidder accountable, the city offered the incentives contingent on the construction of a minimum of five stores in the

city's Enterprise Zone. The first chain that was supposed to invest in South Dallas, Fiesta Mart, built only three of the five stores. Because Fiesta Mart did not comply with the five-store minimum, the city then contracted with Minyard's. Attracted by the financial incentives, Minyard's is building all five stores.¹⁷⁵ In Los Angeles, a Vons supermarket took advantage of public subsidies and was the first to open in Compton after the civil unrest. They closed their doors a short time later without being held accountable. Los Angeles needs to institute a system of accountability that fosters widespread success and prevents ongoing inner city abandonment.

Community: Involved

Coincidentally, Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) has devised the strategy of "accountable development" as a way to link the community in a meaningful way to the construction of new businesses and urban redevelopment projects. Central to the accountable development model is the Community Benefits Plan (CBP).

The CBP process begins with interested members of the community, who identify how a proposed development project can benefit residents and workers. Once a list of potential benefits is determined, community members meet with the developer and representative of the city to negotiate a CBP. The CBP is a legal document that becomes part of the city's agreement with the developer. It contains numerous provisions stipulating exactly how the development will benefit the community. Each CBP is unique, reflecting the needs of particular communities.¹⁷⁶

Los Angeles city government, as well as many private developers in LA, are already familiar with LAANE's approach around accountable development; the Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment District; NoHo Commons housing development, and SunQuest Business Park are instituting CBPs into their construction plans. Because the city and corporations will be familiar with the approach and will be able to observe examples of success, implementing a CBP for supermarket development can become a more standardized process.

A Supermarket Community Benefits Plan (SCBP) could include the following:¹⁷⁷

Quality Jobs

Living Wage Jobs:

Because the supermarket will likely be developed using public subsidies, all construction workers and any permanent non-retail employees will be guaranteed a living wage under the Living Wage Ordinance, Administrative Code, Section 10.37. Part of the agreement between the city and the supermarket could involve a "Living Wage Incentive Program," which would increase benefits if the store agrees to pay a living wage.

Worker Retention:

This is an important precaution to take in an age of supermarket consolidation. Requiring that the supermarket follow the Worker Retention Ordinance, Administrative code, Section 10.36, will ensure that if a store closes, or is bought out by another company, the new store will be required to hire the same employees. This will help employees achieve greater job security.

Responsible Contractor:

It is often the case that a developer will construct the store and then lease it to a business such as Ralphs. In these cases, the developer can agree to the Responsible Contractor Ordinance, Administrative Code, Section 10.40, which says that the contractor will not lease to a business that has violated workplace or environmental laws.

Union Jobs:

While legally the city cannot force a store to hire union workers for construction, and to have a unionized staff once the store is opened, these practices can be strongly encouraged. Unions can also be beneficial to the supermarket and the community if they provide training for employees.

Community Services

Filling Gaps in Service:

The city and the supermarket can work together to develop a transportation plan that will provide a means for people without cars to shop at the store. This could include encouraging the store to provide a van service, or requiring the city to improve public transportation access near the supermarket. The supermarket could also include services such as banking, something often lacking in low-income communities.

Built-out Space:

city projects. That way all supermarket companies in Los Angeles will have a stake in increasing supermarket access in low-income communities.

City-wide Ordinance on Supermarket Access:

While such an ordinance does not presently exist, an agreement between supermarket chains

established a farmers' market on site in the parking lot on the slowest sales day as a way to increase access and overall sales (since farmers' market shoppers are then likely to shop at the supermarket as well for other items and thereby increase overall sales).

Overcoming the Gap

Access to fresh, quality, and affordable food is a crucial community, health, and quality of life concern. Each of the players capable of helping fill the gap – community groups, the public sector, and the food retail industry – has an important role in pursuing that goal. The concept of accountable development – a key need that was never addressed in the aftermath of the April 1992 civil unrest – is a critical missing link in developing the strategies and gaining the community support that can make stores not only successful, but an invaluable community asset. If the shopper is king, then the wisdom of the shopper and the communities in which he or she resides, as well as the policies established by the city, and the investment and operational insights of the market developers, need to be part of the process of change; change that is not only promised but realized.

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
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- 95. "Closing in on front-end shrink" (Progressive Grocer, v 75 May 1999): 12-13
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- 97. "The Many Faces of Shrink," (Progressive Grocer v 76, February 1997): 82-3

Name	Annual Sales Volume	Definition	Examples in Los Angeles County	
Small Grocery	Less than \$1 million	Mom'n'pop, corner store	J & J Grocery, Lou's Market	
Superette	\$1million-\$2million	Typically independent, small		
Convenience Store	\$2 million plus if they sell gas	Self-service grocery store with limited line of high-convenience items (ready-to-eat), majority sell gasoline, long hours.	7-11, AM PM	
Limited assortment/ gourmet store	N/A	Focus is natural and gourmet or special pricing, smaller, sell fewer nonfood items, and less complete line of food, may not carry perishables.	Trader Joe's Market, 99 Cents Only, Hong Kong Supermarket	
Grocery Store	Any amount: all-encompassing term	Retail store selling dry grocery, canned goods, or non-food items, plu2.8(dr)-11.5(m)1.2(s)-4.9(,)-31.	.6L6L6L6L6L6L6L6L6L6L6L6L65(o)-7.5(na)-3(n)-1437n4(l)-14

Source: Rebuild LA, <u>RLA Grocery Store Market Potential Study</u>, October 1995 Тæб



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	ALBERTSON'S	6255 E 2ND ST	LONG BEACH	CA	90803 (562) 430-4822
	ALBERTSON'S	3400 E SOUTH ST	LONG BEACH	CA	90805 (562) 529-6098
	ALBERTSON'S	101 E WILLOW ST	LONG BEACH	CA	90806(562)988-8785
	ALBERTSON'S	6235 E SPRING ST	LONG BEACH	CA	90808(562)425-8456
	ALBERTSON'S	644 REDONDO AVE	LONG BEACH	CA	90814(562)439-4004
	ALBERTSON'S	298 E LIVE OAK AVE	ARCADIA	CA	91006(626) 446-1416
	ALBERTSON'S	725 E HUNTINGTON DR	MONROVIA	CA	91016(626) 305-4231
	ALBERTSON'S	6240 FOOTHILL BLVD	TUJUNGA	CA	91042
	ALBERTSON'S	3841 E SIERRA MADRE BLVD	PASADENA	CA	91107 (626) 351-0076
	ALBERTSON'S		GLENDALE	CA	91201 (818) 244-8485
I.					

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ALBERTSON'S	43543 20TH ST W	LANCASTER	CA	93534(661)940-4747
ALBERTSON'S	1010 E AVENUE J	LANCASTER	CA	93535(661)948-7332
ALBERTSON'S	38727 TIERRA SUBIDA AVE	PALMDALE	CA	93551 (661) 274-9557
ALBERTSON'S	4644 E AVENUE S	PALMDALE	CA	93552 (661) 285-5400
ALPHA GROCERY	690 E HOLT AVE	POMONA	CA	91767 (909) 629-1666
WAREHOUSE ALPINE VILLAGE	833 TORRANCE BLVD # 1	TORRANCE	CA	90502 (310) 323-6520
AMAPOLA MEXICAN DELI	7223 COMPTON AVE	LOS ANGELES	CA	90001 (323) 587-7118
ARDEN GROUP INC	2020 S CENTRAL AVE	COMPTON	CA	90220(310) 638-2842
ASSI SUPER INC	3525 W 8TH ST	LOS ANGELES	CA	90005 (213) 388-0900
BEACH GROCERY CO	1700 W MAGNOLIA BLVD # 100	BURBANK	CA	91506 (818) 841-3016
BEACH GROCERY CO	8235 GARVEY AVE	ROSEMEAD	CA	91770(626) 280-5607
BERBERIAN ENTERPRISES	5315 SANTA MONICA BLVD	LOS ANGELES	CA	90029 (323) 460-4646
BIG BUY FOODS INC	2233 E CESAR E CHAVEZ AVE	LOS ANGELES	CA	90033 (323) 264-2230
BIG SAVER FOODS	2619 N FIGUEROA ST	LOS ANGELES	CA	90065 (323) 222-0113
BIG SAVER FOODS	7619 GARVEY AVE	ROSEMEAD	CA	91770(626) 571-7816
BODEGA LATINA	5702 FIRESTONE BLVD	SOUTH GATE	CA	90280 (562) 927-2693
BRISTOL FARMS INC	1570 ROSECRANS AVE	MANHATTAN BEACH	CA	90266 (310) 643-5229
BRISTOL FARMS INC	837 SILVER SPUR RD	ROLLING HLS ESTS	CA	90274 (310) 541-9157
BRISTOL FARMS INC	2080 N BELLFLOWER BLVD	LONG BEACH	CA	90815 (562) 430-4134
BRISTOL FARMS INC	606 FAIR OAKS AVE	SOUTH PASADENA	CA	91030(626) 441-5455 Tc[(910)7.5(30)].0009 Tc0

FOOD 4 LESS	5420 W SUNSET BLVD	LOS ANGELES	CA	90027 (323) 871-8011
FOOD 4 LESS	2750 E 1ST ST	LOS ANGELES	CA	90033 (323) 268-0461
FOOD 4 LESS	11840 WILMINGTON AVE	LOS ANGELES	CA	90059(323) 564-3986
FOOD 4 LESS	14500 OCEAN GATE AVE	HAWTHORNE	CA	90250(310) 644-1183
FOOD 4 LESS	11245 LONG BEACH BLVD	LYNWOOD	CA	90262 (310) 632-9954
FOOD 4 LESS	3200 W CENTURY BLVD	INGLEWOOD	CA	90303 (310) 677-2520
FOOD 4 LESS	7810 NORWALK BLVD	WHITTIER	CA	90606(562)699-3358
FOOD 4 LESS	10901 IMPERIAL HWY	NORWALK	CA	90650(562)868-6685
FOOD 4 LESS	8620 WHITTIER BLVD	PICO RIVERA	CA	90660(562)948-3435
FOOD 4 LESS	12222 CARSON ST	HAWAIIAN GARDENS	CA	90716(562)938-7302
FOOD 4 LESS	2185 E SOUTH ST	LONG BEACH	CA	90805 (562) 422-9646
FOOD 4 LESS	6700 CHERRY AVE	LONG BEACH	CA	90805 (562) 220-2373
FOOD 4 LESS	1600 E WILLOW ST	SIGNAL HILL	CA	90806(562)989-7576
FOOD 4 LESS	20155 SATICOY ST	CANOGA PARK	CA	91306(818) 998-8074
FOOD 4 LESS	9635 LAUREL CANYON BLVD	PACOIMA	CA	91331 (818) 897-3545
FOOD 4 LESS	8530 TOBIAS AVE	PANORAMA CITY	CA	91402 (818) 830-7085
FOOD 4 LESS	8035 WEBB AVE	NORTH HOLLYWOOD	CA	91605 (818) 252-4855
	DWIN PARK BLVD	BALDWIN PARK) 856-0511

 1801 N HACIENDA BLVD
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RALPHS GROCERY CO RALPHS GROCERY CO

2700 N SEPULVEDA BLVD 15120 W SUNSET BLVD 1413 HAWTHORNE BLVD 910 LINCOLN BLVD 4311 LINCOLN BLVD 4700 ADMIRALTY WAY 1644 CLOVERFIELD BLVD 17500 CRENSHAW BLVD 2909 ROLLING HILLS RD 3455 SEPULVEDA BLVD 5035 PACIFIC COAST HWY 11825 WHITTIER BLVD

MANHATTAN BEACH	CA
PACIFIC PLSDS	CA
REDONDO BEACH	CA
VENICE	CA
MARINA DEL REY	CA
MARINA DEL REY	CA
SANTA MONICA	CA
TORRANCE	CA
WHITTIER	

90266 (310) 546-2471 90272 (310) 454-3001 90278 (310) 370-9446 90291 (310) 392-4854 90292 (310) 574-0909 90292 (310) 823-4684 90404 (310) 582-3900 90504 (310) 327-3277 90505 (310) 325-0611 90505 (310) 542-1639 90505 (310) 378-0294

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	RALPHS GROCERY CO	22333 SHERMAN WAY	CANOGA PARK	CA	91303 (818) 883-1230
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	22915 VICTORY BLVD	CANOGA PARK	CA	91307 (818) 716-8199
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	21431 DEVONSHIRE ST	CHATSWORTH	CA	91311(818) 341-0950
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	17800 VENTURA BLVD	ENCINO	CA	91316(818) 345-6882
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	19781 RINALDI ST	NORTHRIDGE	CA	91326(818) 832-5955
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	18300 VANOWEN ST # 29	RESEDA	CA	91335 (818) 343-3492
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	12689 GLENOAKS BLVD	SYLMAR	CA	91342 (818) 362-3309
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	10823 ZELZAH AVE	GRANADA HILLS	CA	91344 (818) 360-6342
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	16940 DEVONSHIRE ST	GRANADA HILLS	CA	91344 (818) 360-8323
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	18010 CHATSWORTH ST	GRANADA HILLS	CA	91344 (818) 831-6556
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	10400 SEPULVEDA BLVD	MISSION HILLS	CA	91345 (818) 365-3296
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	19340 SOLEDAD CANYON RD	SANTA CLARITA	CA	91351(661)252-6226
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	8325 LAUREL CANYON BLVD	SUN VALLEY	CA	91352 (818) 768-0377
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	27760 MCBEAN PKWY	VALENCIA	CA	91354(661) 263-7690
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	25930 MCBEAN PKWY	VALENCIA	CA	91355(661) 254-3440
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	20060 VENTURA BLVD	WOODLAND HILLS	CA	91364 (818) 883-7551
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	21909 VENTURA BLVD	WOODLAND HILLS	CA	91364 (818) 883-1907
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	632 LINDERO CANYON RD	OAK PARK	CA	91377 (818) 991-4962
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	24975 PICO CANYON RD	STEVENSON RANCH	CA	91381(661)253-0656
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	31970 CASTAIC RD	CASTAIC	CA	91384(661) 257-0906
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	14440 BURBANK BLVD	VAN NUYS	CA	91401 (818) 989-5640
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	7225 WOODMAN AVE	VAN NUYS	CA	91405 (818) 785-3162
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	17250 SATICOY ST	VAN NUYS	CA	91406(818) 609-8425
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	12921 MAGNOLIA BLVD	SHERMAN OAKS	CA	91423 (818) 986-2292
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	14049 VENTURA BLVD	SHERMAN OAKS	CA	91423 (818) 784-2674
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	16325 VENTURA BLVD	ENCINO	CA	91436(818) 386-0118
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	1028 S SAN FERNANDO BLVD	BURBANK	CA	91502(818) 843-7563
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	25 E ALAMEDA AVE	BURBANK	CA	91502(818) 556-1558
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	1100 N SAN FERNANDO BLVD	BURBANK	CA	91504 (818) 845-6424
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	2500 W VICTORY BLVD	BURBANK	CA	91505 (818) 845-5914
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	10900 MAGNOLIA BLVD	NORTH HOLLYWOOD	CA	91601 (818) 760-4148
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	10901 VENTURA BLVD	STUDIO CITY	CA	91604 (818) 760-7008
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	12842 VENTURA BLVD	STUDIO CITY	CA	91604 (818) 761-6196
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	6657 LAUREL CANYON BLVD	NORTH HOLLYWOOD	CA	91606(818) 765-2770
	RALPHS GROCERY CO	11950 GARVEY AVE	EL MONTE	CA	

RALPHS GROCERY CO	345 E MAIN ST	ALHAMBRA	CA	91801(626)458-6256
RALPHS GROCERY CO	1803 E PALMDALE BLVD	PALMDALE	CA	93550(661)947-7794
RALPHS MARKET	5080 RODEO RD	LOS ANGELES	CA	90016(323) 292-0633
RALPHS MARKET	2716 N SAN FERNANDO RD	LOS ANGELES	CA	90065 (323) 225-5127
RALPHS MARKET	9200 LAKEWOOD BLVD	DOWNEY	CA	90240 (562) 869-2041
RALPHS MARKET	1969 W AVENUE L			

STATER BROTHERS	37218 47TH ST E	PALMDALE	CA	93552(661) 285-9184
STATER BROTHER'S	2845 W AVENUE L	LANCASTER	CA	93536(661) 943-2545
STATER BROTHERS MARKETS	6501 E SPRING ST	LONG BEACH	CA	90808 (562) 429-5611
STATER BROTHERS MARKETS	1850 E AVENUE J	LANCASTER	CA	93535(661)948-1885
SUIZA MORNINGSTAR FOODS	18275 ARENTH AVE	LA PUENTE	CA	91748(626) 810-1775
SUPER A FOODS	2924 W BEVERLY BLVD	MONTEBELLO	CA	90640(323)725-1559
SUPER A FOODS	6101 ROSEMEAD BLVD	PICO RIVERA	CA	90660 (562) 942-7337
SUPER A FOODS	300 W MAIN ST	ALHAMBRA	CA	91801 (626) 282-0605
SUPER MERCADO VALLARTA	9136 SEPUL-14.45N PDf6(PDf6(R)	DSENDFAI27B1]TJ236 ref31	PT1VD02 -14	.463-14.4664 607.8 47.82 -14.46 re-14.R.7(61)L7(


VONS CO	1440 W 25TH ST	SAN PEDRO	CA	90732(310) 832-8459
VONS CO	820 N WESTERN AVE	SAN PEDRO	CA	90732(310) 832-5654
VONS CO	600 E BROADWAY	LONG BEACH	CA	90802(562)624-2350
VONS CO	1033 LONG BEACH BLVD	LONG BEACH	CA	90813 (562) 624-2344
VONS CO	1820 XIMENO AVE	LONG BEACH	CA	90815 (562) 498-2111
VONS CO	133 E FOOTHILL BLVD	ARCADIA	CA	91006(626) 357-3647
VONS CO	635 FOOTHILL BLVD	LA CANADA	CA	91011 (818) 790-7563

Zip Code

Supermarkets Per Household	
% less than \$34,999	
Less than \$34,999	9565
% 15,000- Less than 34,999 \$34,999	39.69
\$15,000- \$34,999	5039
% less than \$15,000	35.65
\$0-\$14,999	4526
Zip Code Total Number of \$0-\$14,999 Households	12696
Zip Code T	90001

15687	3384	8348	30353	9477	18271	9927	14399	6464	14503	7145	8719	9241	15078	16628 -82.2 re
90247	90248	90249	90250	90254	90255	90260	90262	90265	90266	90270	90272	90274	90275	90277

1.21E-04	3.01E-04	8.51E-05	9.80E-05	2.26E-04	4.72E-05	0.00E+00	2.11E-04	1.87E-04	3.69E-04	9.34E-04	0.00E+00	1.31E-04	8.79E-05	3.25E-04	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	
51.83	25.2	33.4	31.96	41.03	36.25	26.94	50.69	37.18	45.88	44.79	37.28	15.04	46.21	42.05	46.2	34.77	28.02
4295	1675	3924	3263	3625	7684	3751	9590	9966	7469	1919	1620	2297	10508	3881	3549	3684	2748
33.55	16.91	22.96	21.04	27.76	22.74	19.57	29.68	23.15	29.4	25.23	22.87	10.15	29.2	24.82	27.14	22.88	19.61
2780	1124	2697	2148	2453	4819	2725	5615	6205	4785	1081	994	1550	6641	2291	2085	2424	1923
18.28	8.29	10.44	10.92	13.26	13.52	7.37	21.01	14.03	16.49	19.56	14.4	4.89	17	17.23	19.06	11.89	8.41
1515	551	1227	1115	1172	2865	1026	3975	3761	2684	838	626	747	3867	1590	1464	1260	825
8287	6646	11748	10209	8836	21195	13923	18918	26805	16278	4284	4346	15272	22741	9229	7682	10596	9808
90602	90603	90604	90605	90906	90631	90638	90640	90650	90660	90670	90701	90703	90706	90707	90710	90712	90713



1.34E-04			
53.63			
7996	7897		
34.92			
5206	5071		
18.71	19.88		
2790	2826	1741	
14909	14217	12386	
91605	91606	91607	

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5.24E-04	40.13	1532	23.52	898	16.61	634	3818	93543
2.85E-04	30.96	4342	16.57	2324	14.39	2018	14026	93536
0.00E+00	36.86	6391	23.1	4005	13.76	2386	17337	93535
0.00E+00	46.43	5979	28.31	3645	18.13	2334	12877	93534
0.00E+00	26.53	291	17.41	191	9.12	100	1097	93532
0.005+00	40.92	DACI	B1.1C	1144	0.13	240	2021	C7CC6

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Race by Zip Cod	17734 1032
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9.42 28.26 15.85 0.52 11.55 43.31 11.82 14.49 5.90 0.41 5.44 41.20 0.41 5.44 41.20 0.9 7.54 16.62 4.18 7.09 12.56 1.78 25.25 17.49 2.42 5.85 19.10 1.78 25.25 17.49 2.42 5.85 19.10 1.78 25.25 11.46 $4.1.37$ 4.66 14.64 40.81 0.84 53.13 9.71 7.53 37.99 $4.1.37$ 4.66 14.64 40.81 0.84 53.13 $4.1.37$ 4.66 14.64 $4.1.37$ 4.66 14.64 5.313 9.71 24.23 $4.1.82$ 0.84 53.13 $4.1.82$ 14.09 25.09 $4.1.82$ 14.09 25.09 1.73 13.89 25.09 1.73 13.89 25.09 1.73 13.89 23.15 0.83 18.89 12.80 1.67 19.19 23.15 1.45 20.14 45.50 1.45 20.14 45.50 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.03 9.07 0.33 12.03 9.07 0.33 12.03 9.07	~	0.91	26.43	17.80	54.59
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11.82 14.49 5.90 0.41 5.44 41.20 0.41 5.44 41.20 0.41 5.44 41.20 0.9 7.54 16.62 1.78 25.25 17.49 1.78 25.25 17.49 1.78 25.25 17.49 1.78 25.25 17.49 1.78 25.25 17.49 1.78 25.25 17.49 40.81 0.84 53.13 9.71 7.53 37.99 4.46 8.78 13.41 $4.1.82$ 14.09 25.09 4.48 16.17 23.29 0.6 38.68 6.53 1.73 13.89 25.09 1.73 13.89 28.92 0.83 18.89 12.80 1.67 19.19 23.15 2.37 20.14 45.50 1.67 19.19 23.15 2.37 20.61 23.15 1.45 20.61 23.15 1.46 1.875 31.93 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.63 9.07 0.33 12.03 9.07	6	0.52	11.55	43.31	78.88
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	~	11.82	14.49	5.90	41.05
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$	~	4	5.44	41.20	74.91
4.18 7.09 12.56 1.78 25.25 17.49 2.42 5.85 19.10 2.42 5.85 19.10 16.01 6.11 24.23 41.37 4.66 14.64 40.81 0.84 53.13 9.71 7.53 37.99 4.46 8.78 13.41 11.82 14.09 25.09 4.48 16.17 23.29 0.6 38.68 6.53 1.73 13.89 25.09 1.73 13.89 25.09 1.73 13.89 25.09 1.73 13.89 25.09 1.73 13.89 25.09 1.73 13.89 25.09 1.73 13.89 25.09 1.73 13.89 25.09 1.73 13.89 25.329 0.83 18.75 20.14 1.67 19.19 23.15 2.37 20.14 45.50 1.45 20.61 20.62 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.63 9.07 0.33 12.63 9.07	10	0.9	7.54	16.62	79.16
1.78 25.25 17.49 2.42 5.85 19.10 2.423 5.85 19.10 16.01 6.11 24.23 41.37 4.66 14.64 40.81 0.84 53.13 9.71 7.53 37.99 4.46 8.78 13.41 11.82 14.09 25.09 4.48 16.17 23.29 0.6 38.68 6.53 0.6 38.68 6.53 1.73 13.89 28.92 0.83 13.89 28.92 0.83 13.89 28.92 0.83 18.89 12.80 1.73 13.89 23.15 2.37 20.14 45.50 1.45 20.14 45.50 1.46 18.75 21.93 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.63 9.07 0.33 12.63 9.07	m	4.18	7.09	12.56	52.65
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$	10	1.78	25.25	17.49	72.6
16.01 6.11 24.23 41.37 4.66 14.64 40.81 0.84 53.13 9.71 7.53 37.99 9.71 7.53 37.99 4.46 8.78 13.41 11.82 14.09 25.09 4.48 16.17 23.29 0.6 38.68 6.53 1.73 13.89 28.92 1.73 13.89 28.92 1.73 13.89 23.15 0.83 18.89 12.80 1.67 19.19 23.15 2.37 20.14 45.50 1.45 20.14 45.50 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.63 10.06 0.33 12.63 10.06	0	2.42	5.85	19.10	66.6
41.37 4.66 14.64 40.81 0.84 53.13 9.71 7.53 37.99 9.71 7.53 37.99 4.46 8.78 13.41 11.82 14.09 25.09 4.48 16.17 23.29 0.6 38.68 6.53 1.73 13.89 25.09 1.73 13.89 25.09 1.73 13.89 25.09 1.73 13.89 25.32 0.83 18.89 12.80 1.67 19.19 23.15 2.37 20.14 45.50 1.59 18.75 31.93 1.45 20.61 20.62 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.63 9.07 0.33 12.63 10.06	e	16.01	6.11	24.23	42.87
40.81 0.84 53.13 9.71 7.53 37.99 9.71 7.53 37.99 4.46 8.78 13.41 11.82 14.09 25.09 1.48 16.17 23.29 0.6 38.68 6.53 1.73 13.89 28.92 0.83 13.89 28.92 0.83 13.89 28.92 0.83 13.89 28.92 0.83 13.89 23.15 2.37 20.14 45.50 1.67 19.19 23.15 2.37 20.14 45.50 1.59 18.75 31.93 1.45 20.61 20.62 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.63 9.07 0.33 12.63 9.07	6	41.37	4.66	14.64	35.3
$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$	0	40.81	0.84	53.13	4.88
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11.82 14.09 25.09 4.48 16.17 23.29 0.6 38.68 6.53 1.73 13.89 28.92 1.73 13.89 28.92 0.83 13.89 28.92 0.83 18.89 12.80 1.67 19.19 23.15 2.37 20.14 45.50 1.59 18.75 31.93 1.59 18.75 31.93 1.45 20.61 20.62 0.41 1.81 11.15 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.63 10.06	-	4.46	8.78	13.41	73.09
4.48 16.17 23.29 0.6 38.68 6.53 1.73 13.89 28.92 0.83 13.89 28.92 0.83 13.89 28.92 0.83 13.89 28.92 0.83 13.89 28.92 0.83 18.89 12.80 1.67 19.19 23.15 2.37 20.14 45.50 1.59 18.75 31.93 1.59 18.75 31.93 1.45 20.61 20.62 0.41 1.81 11.15 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.63 10.06	-	11.82	14.09	25.09	48.24
0.6 38.68 6.53 1.73 13.89 28.92 1.73 13.89 28.92 0.83 18.89 12.80 1.67 19.19 23.15 2.37 20.14 45.50 1.59 18.75 31.93 1.45 20.61 20.62 1.45 20.61 20.62 0.41 1.81 11.15 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.63 10.06	0	4.48	16.17	23.29	55.62
1.73 13.89 28.92 0.83 18.89 12.80 0.83 18.19 23.15 1.67 19.19 23.15 2.37 20.14 45.50 1.59 18.75 31.93 1.59 18.75 31.93 1.45 20.61 20.62 0.41 1.81 11.15 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.63 10.06	പ	0.6	38.68	6.53	54.03
0.83 18.89 12.80 1.67 19.19 23.15 2.37 20.14 45.50 1.59 18.75 31.93 1.45 20.61 20.62 0.41 1.81 11.15 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.63 10.06	ø	1.73	13.89	28.92	54.92
1.67 19.19 23.15 2.37 20.14 45.50 1.59 18.75 31.93 1.45 20.61 20.62 0.41 1.81 11.15 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.63 10.06	ø	0.83	18.89	12.80	67.04
2.37 20.14 45.50 1.59 18.75 31.93 1.45 20.61 20.62 0.41 1.81 11.15 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.63 10.06	ю	1.67	19.19	23.15	55.66
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1.45 20.61 20.62 0.41 1.81 11.15 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.63 10.06	4	1.59	18.75	31.93	47.25
0.41 1.81 11.15 1.48 15.03 9.07 0.33 12.63 10.06	0	1.45	20.61	20.62	56.86
1.48 15.03 9.07 74.1 0.33 12.63 10.06 76.6	e	0.41	1.81	11.15	75.98
.33 12.63 10.06 76.6	6	1.48		9.07	ς.
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Race by Zip Code, cont...

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68.8	84.96	14.98	31.79	69.48	25.45	6.75	
20.83	7.23	67.42	55.99	20.90	63.45	77.58	
5.73	4.54	12.73	7.48	5.39	7.20	12.70	
4.04	2.83	4.33	4.23	3.72	3.34	2.48	
11658	21733	7938	13015	18120	14309	5191	
3529	1850	35720	22920	5452	35675	59673	
971	1162	6744	3061	1407	4049	9767	3402
685	723	2293	1732	971	1880	1911	2004
)45	80	178	36)81	29	115	'45

17.2	74.7	66.85	82.8	66.15	66.29	66.72	48.8	54.24	66.14	51.2	58.1	58.5
38.86	18.00	17.18	10.63	22.54	21.53	20.65	39.23	33.99	22.70	35.35	26.30	30.22
42.22	2.26	5.22	1.73	4.03	3.97	4.68	2.24	4.33	6.05	6.04	1.96	3.23
1.26	3.96	9.94	3.09	6.31	7.37	7.04	8.47	6.68	4.39	6.67	12.24	6.95
5438	6075	7859	2734	23265	34128	30430	6145	33455	20121	10868	2194	4160
12286	1464	2020	351	7926	11084	9416	4940	20965	2069	7504	993	2149
13348	184	614	57	1419	2045	2136	282	2668	1840	1282	74	230
399	322	1168	102	2218	3794	3209	1067	4122	1337	1416	462	494
31613	8132	11756	3302	35170	51479	45607	12591	61685	30422	21228	3776	7111
91803	93510	93523	93532	93534	93535	93536	93543	93550	93551	93552	93553	93591

^[1] Urbanski, Al "Trade Class and Store Format Definitions" (Redefining Retail: VNU USA's definitive analysef318.12 387.78 1.2815.3(n)-3.1(g)11.9(R)-16.1(e th1(g8-s")-7. U. Cla)-S.15.7(f)r] Acene, 0001 ET3.62 577.05 (f) = 0.1001 ET3.05 (f) =

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